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Do shocks to bank business activities caused by supervisory enforcement actions affect the 
macroeconomy? And if so, how large is the effect? Does it persist in the long run? How do competitor 
banks of the institutions that are affected by supervisory actions respond? Answering these questions is 
key to understanding macro-financial linkages. Moreover, it is also central to understanding how banks 
react to the supervisory environment. This is a timely question of relevance for academics, 
policymakers, and the public alike against the background of far-reaching changes in banking 
regulation following a wave of government interventions into financial systems globally, and the 
signing into law of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the U.S.1  
In this paper, we use shocks imposed on bank business activities via severe supervisory 
enforcement actions such as Formal agreements, Prompt corrective actions, and Cease and desist 
orders issued by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve System (Fed), 
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to identify their effect on a set of 
macroeconomic variables in U.S. counties through lending and liquidity creation. Such enforcement 
actions typically come in the aftermath of on-site inspections by regulators which follow a rotation rule 
that assigns federal and state regulators to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals (Agarwal, 
Lucca, Seru, and Trebbi (2014)).  
To the extent that bank credit has no close substitutes as argued by Diamond (1984) and James 
(1987), we hypothesize that enforcement actions which affect the scope and scale of bank activities 
affect the macroeconomy. This reflects that enforcement actions typically reduce banks’ ability to 
intermediate loans and deposits. Since banking markets are local in nature, we focus in our main tests 
on enforcement actions in single-market banks that operate within one county. Such clearly defined 
                                                          
1  Recent work by Ongena, Popov, and Udell (2013) points towards cross-border spillovers of banking regulation, and 
Giannetti and Simonov (2013) show that government interventions that restore capital requirements stimulate credit 
provision. In contrast, Duchin and Soysura (2014) highlight that government intervention via recapitalizations triggers 
unintended consequences. Upon receiving a bailout, U.S. banks originate riskier loans and invest into riskier securities. 
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geographical boundaries avoid noise from spillovers across counties and help identification. As we 
show in this research, our results remain intact when we extend our analyses to allow for the impact of 
enforcement actions on multi-market banks.  
We combine bank-specific data for 7,025 banks operating in 1,891 U.S. counties (9,435 
county-year observations) with macroeconomic variables for the period 1999 to 2011. For our tests that 
explore the transmission channel through which enforcement actions affect growth, we examine their 
effects on lending and liquidity creation. The latter is based on a new measure of bank liquidity 
creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). The basic intuition of this measure is that banks create liquidity 
by transforming illiquid assets into liquid liabilities.  
To overcome the fact that economic growth, unemployment, and other macroeconomic 
variables as well as bank lending, and health are endogenously determined, our identification strategy 
relies on instrumental variables estimators. As described in greater detail in Section 2.2 below, we 
exploit plausibly exogenous variation in supervisory monitoring intensity which is reflected in the one, 
two, and three year lagged differences of the assignment of Less severe enforcement actions and in the 
lagged difference of the Severe enforcement action dummy.  
Our main result suggests that severe enforcement actions which impose restrictions on bank 
activities such as deposit taking and origination of credit exert significantly negative effects on real per 
capita personal income growth, the number of establishments per 100 inhabitants, and the 
unemployment rate. The effects are substantial in terms of economic magnitudes: Severe actions are 
associated with a 0.70 percentage point reduction in personal income growth, and the number of 
establishments per capita declines by 0.02 percentage points when regulators issue severe enforcement 
actions. The unemployment rate increases by 0.16 percentage points. These results are similar when we 
use OLS, and remain unaffected by the inclusion of control variables. A first extension of our main 
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analysis reiterates these inferences for a sample comprising multi-market banks, and a further 
extension shows that the effects of regulatory enforcement actions are limited during crises. 
An exploration of the transmission mechanism suggests that these macro-financial linkages are 
attributable to contractions in bank lending. We observe considerable reductions in consumer lending, 
in credit supply to the commercial and industrial sector, and commercial real estate lending also 
contracts. Since bank lending neither considers the full scale of banks’ intermediation activities nor 
considers off balance sheet activities such as lines of credit and guarantees, we additionally examine 
liquidity creation. This analysis highlights that liquidity creation, especially on the asset side of the 
balance sheet, contracts even more in response to severe enforcement actions than does bank lending.   
To sharpen causal inference, additional tests that exploit information on the number of banks 
and the scope of external financial dependence of non-financial firms on the county level further 
strengthen our results. We show that the adverse macroeconomic effects are more pronounced in 
counties with fewer banks, suggesting that a lack of alternative sources of funds matters for the 
transmission of shocks from the banking industry to the real economy. Similarly, we find that the 
macroeconomy contracts more in counties whose industries are more reliant on external financing.   
Our final set of tests focus on the long run and the behavior of competitor banks. We illustrate 
that the adverse effects for the real economy are only observable immediately after the announcement 
of enforcement actions but cannot be documented in the three subsequent years. Competitor banks, 
defined as those institutions located in the same county, do not increase lending or liquidity creation.  
This research is related to several strands of literature. A few studies examine the direct effects 
of enforcement actions which can range from civil money penalties to restrictions on services such as 
deposit taking or provision of credit. Peek and Rosengren (1995, 1996) demonstrate that loan 
portfolios shrink following enforcement actions in the U.S. Recent work by Delis, Staikouras, and 
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Tsoumas (forthcoming) also examines enforcement actions in the U.S. They show that asset quality of 
banks subject to supervisory enforcement actions declines. Using data for Germany, Berger, Bouwman, 
Kick, and Schaeck (2016) document that supervisory interventions disrupt liquidity creation. Most 
closely related to our paper is work by Berger and Roman (forthcoming). They take a macroeconomic 
perspective, and show that TARP resulted in significant increases in net job creation, more 
establishments, and reductions in bankruptcies.  
Our work is also related to the studies on the real effects of bank distress, and research that 
analyzes how credit and liquidity supply shocks to banks transmit to the real sector. Bernanke (1983), 
and Calomiris and Mason (2003) show loan supply shocks reduce local economic output, and more 
recent research documents that bank failures reduce county income and reduce physical output 
(Ashcraft, 2005; Ziebarth, 2013). A larger number of studies focuses on how corporate investment and 
access to credit deteriorate when banks’ liquidity supply contracts (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 1995, 
1996; Gan, 2007; Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Paravisini, 2008; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011; Schnabl, 
2012). In contrast, the literature on how bank bailouts affect banks’ borrowers is very limited. Norden, 
Rosenboom, and Wang (2013) show that capital injections in the U.S. trigger positive stock return 
responses by these banks’ borrowers. Our paper distinguishes itself from these studies by focusing on a 
new type of shock arising from supervisory enforcement actions.
2
   
Section 1 discusses the institutional background. Section 2 describes the dataset, and offers a 
preliminary investigation of basic statistics and our identification strategy. We present results in 
Section 3. Section 4 offers concluding remarks.  
 
                                                          
2 
 Recent work by Berger and Roman (2015) and Calderon and Schaeck (forthcoming) examines how government 
interventions in the form of capital support affect banking competition.  
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1. Institutional Background: Enforcement Actions  
In pursuing the aim to maintain a safe and sound banking system, different agencies (FDIC, 
Federal Reserve System, and OCC) are charged with bank supervision. One of the key tools to achieve 
this aim are on-site examinations. In instances when these on-site examinations suggest unsafe, 
unsound, or illegal practices which violate laws, enforcement actions are used to restore safety and 
soundness by altering bank practices, stabilising the institution, and averting losses to the deposit 
insurer (Curry, O’Keefe, Coburn, and Montgomery, 1999). Typical reasons for the initiation of 
enforcement actions are management problems (poor loan administration, insufficient corporate 
planning, poor internal controls), and financial problems (inadequate capital and inadequate loan loss 
reserves, poor asset quality, clustering of loan portfolio risks, failure to charge off loan losses, poor 
liquidity, insider payments, failure to file with regulators). Noncompliance with enforcement actions 
can result in termination of deposit insurance. Since banks understand that their asset choices 
determine supervisory closure rules, enforcement actions are likely to trigger changes in conduct 
(Mailath and Mester, 1994).  
Several different enforcement actions exist. For our analyses, we group them together into Less 
severe actions and Severe actions based on their seriousness, disclosure requirements, whether they 
can be enforced in court, and based on whether they have potential to affect the scope and scale of 
bank activities (Curry et al., 1999; Ioannidou, 2005). Our grouping reflects both supervisory practice in 
the U.S., and also considers the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, issued in 
2012. We now list the actions in ascending order. 
The following types of actions are classified as Less severe actions.  
Civil money penalties are imposed for violations of laws, regulations, Cease and desist orders, 
or Formal Agreements. They are publicly known. Typical penalties relate to violations of the Bank 
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Secrecy Act, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and to Call Report infractions. This type of 
enforcement action carries charges from $1,000 to $1 million per day, depending on the severity.    
Suspension, removal, and prohibition orders allow regulators to bar individuals from 
associating with a bank due to violation of laws, regulations, or other written agreements.
3
  These 
actions are disclosed and publicly available. A typical civil money penalty that in our example also 
goes hand in hand with a removal and prohibition order reads as follows: 
“WILLIAM BEN DUPREE, III (“Respondent”) has received a NOTICE OF INTENTION TO REMOVE FROM 
OFFICE AND PROHIBIT FROM FURTHER PARTICIPATION AND NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT OF A 
CIVIL MONEY PENALTY, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER TO PAY AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING issued by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") detailing the violations of 
law or regulation, unsafe or unsound banking practices and/or breaches of fiduciary duty for which an ORDER OF 
REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND PROHIBITION FROM FURTHER PARTICIPATION AND ORDER TO 
PAY A CIVIL MONEY PENALTY (the "ORDER") may issue, and has been further advised of the right to a 
hearing on the alleged charges under sections […].”
4
 
We consider the following enforcements as Severe actions, all of them are disclosed.   
Formal (written) agreements are bilateral agreements between the bank and the regulator which 
set out details on how to correct conditions which are the basis for the agreement. This type of 
enforcement action is not followed by a federal court case verdict.   
Cease and desist orders are issued following hearings. Unlike Formal agreements, they are 
imposed on the bank by the regulator. Cease and desist orders, can come in the form of restrictions on 
bank activities, e.g., on asset growth and the prohibition of asset disposals. Moreover, Cease and desist 
orders go beyond the restriction of activities and usually require remedial actions to correct violations 
of laws and improve safety and soundness of the institution. Unlike Formal agreements, they can be 
enforced in court.  
                                                          
3   Note that when illegal actions of individuals threaten the safety and soundness of the bank itself, a Cease and desist order 
or a Formal agreement will be issued against the institution as well.  
4  The entire document with the Order of Removal from Office and Prohibition from Further Participation and Order to pay 
a Civil Money Penalty can be downloaded from https://www5.fdic.gov/edo/DataPresentation.html using docket number: 
FDIC-10-624k. Our manual search for a variety of other enforcement actions suggests the details of this removal and 
prohibition order are representative.  
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Prompt corrective actions are imposed on undercapitalized banks. This action demands 
corrective measures to restore adequate levels of capital, and requires submission of a capital 
restoration plan within a predetermined time period. Depending on the level of undercapitalisation, 
Prompt corrective actions can trigger dismissals of senior executives, and carry restrictions on 
executive pay, asset growth, and prohibition of: acquisitions, establishing new branches, issuing new 
lines of credit, selling company shares, and disposing assets.  
Deposit insurance threats are the most severe enforcement action before a bank is placed in 
receivership, which leads to termination of the banks’ charter or sale to other investors. 
A typical severe action which details the requirements for capital restoration plans, limits on 
capital disbursements, asset growth, and also contains restrictions on bonus payments, reads as follows: 
“[…] 1. The Bank shall no later than 60 days of the date of this Directive (or such additional time as the Board of 
Governors may permit):  
a) Increase the Bank's equity through the sale of shares or contributions to surplus in an amount sufficient 
to make the Bank adequately capitalized as defined in section 208.43(b)(2) of Regulation H of the Board of 
Governors (12 C.F.R. § 208.43(b)(2)); 
 
[…] 
 
2. The Bank shall comply fully with the provisions of section 38(d)(1) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. § 1831o(d)(1)) 
restricting the making of any capital distributions, including, but not limited to, the payment of dividends.  
 
3. The Bank shall not, without the prior written approval of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (the "Reserve 
Bank") and the fulfillment of one of the requirements set forth in paragraph 1, solicit and accept new deposit 
accounts or renew any time deposit bearing an interest rate that exceeds the prevailing effective rates on deposits 
of comparable amounts and maturities in the Bank's market area. 
 
[…] 
 
5. The Bank shall comply fully with the provisions of sections 38(f)(4)(A)(i) and (ii) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1831o(f)(4)(A)(i) and (ii)) restricting the payment of bonuses to senior executive officers and increases in 
compensation of such officers.  
 
6. The Bank shall comply fully with the provisions of sections 38(e)(3) and (4) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 
1831o(e)(3) and (4)) restricting asset growth, acquisitions, branching, and new lines of business. […]”5 
 
                                                          
5
  The full text document with additional details for this Prompt corrective action can be downloaded from 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20110811a1.pdf. We verify with a manual search that 
this example is highly representative for other severe enforcement actions. 
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Table 1 provides an overview about enforcement actions in single-market banks. In total, we 
observe 1,129 Less severe actions and 1,530 Severe actions. We record 744 Formal agreements. Cease 
and desist orders account for 911 observations, and there are 46 Prompt corrective actions (some of the 
banks received actions simultaneously). Regulators have not issued Deposit insurance threats during 
the sample period for single-market banks.
6
  
[TABLE 1: Time distribution of enforcement actions] 
2. Data Description and Identification Strategy  
We obtain Call Report data for all commercial and savings banks in the U.S. from SNL 
Financial. This database also contains information about the timing and types of enforcement actions, 
branch location information, and deposit market shares from the Summary of Deposits from the FDIC. 
Our main regressions focus on the period 1999-2011, excluding the 2000-2002 and 2007-2009 crisis 
periods as our main tests examine the effects of enforcement actions during normal periods rather than 
during crises. To examine whether regulatory enforcement actions trigger differential effects during 
crises, we focus in separate analyses on the years 2000-2002 and 2007-2009 because these years are 
classified by Berger and Bouwman (2013) as crisis episodes.   
Our main analyses examine enforcement actions in banks that operate in only one market, 
referred to as single-market banks, to allow a better demarcation of the boundaries of the relevant 
market for which we try to establish the real effects of enforcement actions. Our choice is predicated 
on the basis that where enforcement actions cause economic disruption, their real effects will be 
limited to the county where the single-market bank operates, allowing for a cleaner identification 
because of geographic market segmentation. This segmentation considers findings by Samolyk (1994) 
                                                          
6 
 All our tests exclude banks from Delaware and South Dakota. Delaware has about 20 times more incorporations than 
other U.S. states due to favorable legal treatment of incorporations, and South Dakota has a very large number of credit 
card banks incorporated resulting in a skewed distribution of measures of banking system structure there.  
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who documents the importance of conditions in the local banking sector for explaining personal 
income growth. Such a regional credit view highlights localized information costs which arise from the 
low spatial mobility of bank customers and the information asymmetries inherent in lending 
relationships (Adams et al., 2007; Felici and Pagnini, 2008). Consequently, the natural unit of analysis 
is the county. We define a single-market county as a county that has at least one single-market bank in 
each year. Figure 1 illustrates that the majority of counties has at least one single-market bank and the 
number of counties with single-market banks is increasing over time. Figure 2 shows that there is no 
systematic clustering of counties in which enforcement actions took place.   
[FIGURE 1: Single-market banks] 
[FIGURE 2: Enforcement actions in single-market banks] 
The econometric appeal arising from our focus on single-market banks however compromises 
the generalizability of our results with respect to large multi-market banks which may pose systemic 
risk. Therefore, we also present regressions that include enforcement actions on banks that operate 
across several different markets.  
2.1. Identification Strategy  
Endogeneity concerns between the macroeconomic environment and bank health, lending, and 
liquidity creation which arise primarily from the lack of random assignment of enforcement actions 
and the possibility of omitting time-varying, county-specific variables that may be coincident with the 
assignment of enforcement actions pose an identification problem: macroeconomic variables, bank 
behavior and supervisory actions are jointly determined. Naïvely regressing macroeconomic variables 
and bank lending and liquidity creation on enforcement actions will yield biased coefficients on the 
variables for the enforcement actions because the error terms will be correlated with the explanatory 
- 11 - 
 
variable. This problem would render causal inference impossible because we do not observe the 
counterfactual. Even in the absence of actions by regulators, banks may recognize possible problems 
and alter their lending and liquidity creation. In the absence of a natural experiment, establishing 
causality therefore requires variables that explain enforcement actions but are neither correlated with 
the macroeconomic setting nor with bank behavior in terms of lending, liquidity creation, and the 
second-stage error term. For our main tests, we therefore use instrumental variables, and rely on a two-
stage estimator, and estimate the following equations.  
EAit = α + βZit + δXit + γi + γt + εit,        (1) 
Yit = α +λEAit +  δXit + γi + γt + εit        (2) 
where EAit denotes the enforcement action, represented by a dummy variable that takes on the value of 
one if a single-market bank was subject to a severe enforcement action in the county at time 𝑡 (zero 
otherwise); 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a set of instruments; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables, defined in detail below; γi 
and γt are county (bank) and year dummies, respectively. The term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We estimate 
the first stage with a linear probability model. All regressions are based on annual data. For 
completeness, we also present regressions based on OLS for our main analyses to understand the 
extent of the bias introduced by OLS.  
Our tests below first focus on the macroeconomic setting. For these tests, the dependent 
variable Yit represents personal income growth deflated using the CPI, the number of establishments, 
and the unemployment rate.
7
 For the tests on the bank level, the dependent variable represents bank 
lending, liquidity creation, and their respective components. There exist a number of difficult-to-
observe variables which may affect both supervisory conduct and the macroeconomy over time (e.g., 
                                                          
7 
 We obtain these variables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the County 
Business Patterns database. 
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during times of strain in the banking system regulators may be more prone to issue enforcement 
actions). We capture these time-invariant omitted variables by including county dummies, 𝛾𝑖 , and 
business cycle fluctuations common to all counties are captured by year dummies 𝛾𝑡.  
The vector of control variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains variables that can affect the macroeconomy and 
also matter for bank lending and liquidity creation. Cross-sectional variations are differenced out via 
our county- (bank-) fixed effects which net out differences in taxation across states that affect 
entrepreneurial activity, and we use year-fixed effects that take out the variation in demand conditions 
across the business cycle (Black and Strahan, 2002). The Z-score, defined as the ratio between a banks’ 
return on assets and its capital ratio dived by the standard deviation of its return on assets, is included 
to consider bank soundness. This measure is an accounting based measure of a bank’s distance to 
default (Laeven and Levine, 2009). We use this variable because bank soundness is reflective of the 
location of a bank, in particular when dealing with banks that operate in geographically delimited areas. 
Moreover, we use a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for deposit market shares to control for market 
structure, and we also account for average firm size (ln). Both variables are skewed and we therefore 
take the natural log. We use this variable to control for the firm structure of the non-financial sector 
because counties with on average larger firms are likely to grow faster as these are typically high-
productivity firms (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004). Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) argue that 
competition in banking affects access to finance and consequently has ramifications on industry 
structure in the non-financial sector. Table 2 presents summary statistics.  
[TABLE 2: Summary statistics] 
2.2  Instrumental variables  
Our identification strategy relies on four plausibly exogenous, yet simple instruments which 
vary across time and across our cross-sectional units. We argue that banks that were subject to Less 
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severe enforcement actions that extend exclusively to banks’ personnel such as fines, civil money 
penalties, suspension, removal, and prohibition orders which bar individuals from associating with a 
bank due to violation of laws, regulations, or other written agreements are good precursors to more 
severe bank problems. We use the first, second, and third lags of the first-differences of a dummy 
variable for these Less severe enforcement actions as instruments for severe enforcement actions.
8
 We 
use lagged first-differences rather than levels of the dummy for the Less severe enforcement actions to 
capture switches between states, which suggest an increase/decrease in the level of supervisory 
monitoring on the bank.
9
 Because the effect of an increase in monitoring can persist for several years, 
we employ three lags of the first-difference of Less severe actions. Since these types of enforcement 
actions only relate to individuals, they are neither affected by nor affect the economy as a whole, nor 
are such actions likely to trigger adjustments in bank behavior. Thus, they are good candidates to meet 
the identifying assumptions for valid instruments. Moreover, while Less severe actions may be more 
likely in counties with worse economic conditions (i.e., in poorer counties, banks’ personnel may be 
more likely to breach regulations), it is unlikely that switches between states are related to short-term 
changes in local economic conditions.  
Using the lagged differences of Less severe enforcement actions also ensures satisfaction of the 
exclusion condition even when the unit of our analysis is the individual bank in the regressions that 
focus on bank lending and liquidity creation. While the behavior of key employees can affect bank 
                                                          
8 
 Our Appendix A.1 documents that less severe enforcement actions correlate positively with severe enforcement actions 
but severe enforcement actions do not trigger less severe enforcement actions.  
9  Note also that using lagged differences of these actions rather than the current levels excludes the possibility that our 
instruments are correlated with omitted variables related to local economic conditions (such as more corruption and fraud 
occurring in counties with low economic growth). For instance, consider the case of a county in which, because of a 
period of low economic growth for several years, people are more likely to commit fraud. In such a county, the dummy 
for Less severe enforcement actions is more likely to be equal to one than in counties with high economic growth for the 
current year. However, the first lagged difference of Less severe enforcement actions (which is constructed using the 
previous two years) will be zero for all the cases in which the levels take on the same value (either zero or one) in two 
consecutive years, excluding by construction the possibility to confound periods of low local economic growth with a 
sudden increase in the level of supervisory monitoring (the latter being the phenomenon we intend to capture with this 
instrument). 
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conduct, it is plausible that the propensity of a bank employee to commit fraud is sluggish (i.e., it is 
unlikely that an individual is prepared to commit fraud in 2003, but not in 2004). A switch from zero to 
one in the value of the lagged differences of Less severe enforcement actions affects the probability of 
occurrence of a Severe enforcement action purely because of increased scrutiny from the regulators on 
the bank: Such stronger scrutiny and monitoring leads to a greater probability that regulators discover 
more severe problems in the bank, relative to banks that have not been subjected to a Less severe 
enforcement action. Therefore, the lagged differences of Less severe enforcement actions satisfy the 
exclusion restriction even for our bank-level regressions. With similar arguments, we also employ as 
an additional instrument the lagged difference of the Severe enforcement action dummy.  
3. Results  
This section first discusses our findings for single-market banks obtained with OLS and 
instrumental variables regressions. Next, we analyse whether multi-market banks respond differently to 
regulatory enforcement actions, and we also present tests that focus on crisis periods. Further 
subsections home in on potential mechanisms behind the effects on the macroeconomy, and we also 
explore whether counties with fewer banks and counties with firms that are more externally financially 
dependent are more affected by regulatory enforcement actions. The final set of analyses examines 
long-run effects and effects on competitor banks. 
3.1 Main results for single-market banks 
Table 3 presents our main results for the effect of severe enforcement actions on the 
macroeconomy using annual data. These regressions include county- and year-fixed effects and cluster 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors on the county level. Our subsequent tests for lending and 
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liquidity creation include bank-and year-fixed effects. We cluster standard errors on the bank level to 
correct for serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004).  
Prior to presenting the findings obtained with the instrumental variables estimator, we present 
OLS results in Panel A of Table 3. This initial test suggests that personal income growth and the 
number of establishments contract significantly in response to severe enforcement actions, and the 
unemployment rate also increases significantly.  
Next, we briefly mention the first stage results from our instrumental variables estimates. Panel 
B of Table 3 shows that the coefficients of all instruments enter at conventional levels of significance 
with the anticipated sign. The lags of the differences of the Less severe enforcement actions are all 
positive, and so is the lagged difference of the severe enforcement actions dummy.   
The second stage results, presented in Panel C of Table 3 reinforce the findings from the OLS 
tests, and offer clear evidence that severe enforcement actions disrupt the real economy. Personal 
income growth, and the number of establishments are significantly reduced, and the unemployment 
rate increases following severe actions by regulators.
10
 The economic magnitude of these effects is 
substantial for all three macroeconomic variables. For personal income growth it is larger in terms of 
absolute values than in the OLS tests, indicating an upward bias in our OLS regressions. For the 
number of establishments and the unemployment rate the economic magnitude of the impact is smaller 
in terms of absolute values for the IV regressions than for the OLS regressions. Against an average 
growth rate of personal income of 1.7 percent, Severe enforcement actions reduce growth by 0.70 
percentage points. Given an average number of 2.4 establishments per 100 inhabitants and an average 
unemployment rate of 6.01 percent, the coefficients indicate that severe actions reduce the former rate 
by 0.017 percentage points, and increase the latter rate by 0.157 percentage points. Thus, while the 
                                                          
10  
We lose 6 observations in the regressions for the unemployment rate because data for these counties are missing.  
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number of establishments is affected only to a limited extent, adjustments are made within firms by 
shedding workforce. This effect ultimately shows up in reduced growth. These magnitudes appear 
plausible. Ashcraft (2005) documents that bank failures result in declines of real economic activity 
measured by county personal income growth of 1.12 percent in the year of failure. Since our analyses 
do not consider the closure of a bank but rather the restrictions of activities, our figures are in the right 
ballpark.   
To verify the choice of our instruments, we investigate several diagnostics. These tests reject 
underidentification of our models, and the Kleibergen Paap F-tests for weak identification likewise do 
not suggest that we suffer from weak instruments. The Hansen J-tests for the correlation between the 
residuals and the instruments support the validity of the exclusion restriction for the instruments. In 
addition, we also present C-tests (or difference-in-Hansen tests) to test for the exogeneity of each of the 
instruments (Brito and Bysted, 2010). This test is defined as the difference between the Hansen statistic 
in the equation with the smaller set of instruments and the equation including the instrument whose 
validity we want to test. Under the null hypothesis that both the smaller set of instruments and the 
suspect instrument are valid, the C-statistic follows a Chi-squared distribution. The results for these 
tests suggest that our instruments are valid.   
[TABLE 3: Main results - The macroeconomic effects of enforcement actions] 
Table 4 examines different types of enforcement actions, and presents coefficients for the 
effects of Formal agreements, Prompt corrective actions, and Cease and desist orders. Panel A shows 
the coefficients obtained with OLS. Formal agreements, Prompt corrective actions, and Cease and 
desist orders are all significantly negatively associated with personal income growth. Formal 
agreements and Cease and desist orders also significantly reduce the number of establishments, and 
Cease and desist orders significantly increase the unemployment rate.  
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Panel B displays the first stage results from the corresponding instrumental variables estimator. 
A quick inspection of the diagnostics for the instrumental variables reinforces the choice of our 
instruments for Formal agreements and Cease and desist orders. Only for Prompt corrective actions do 
the test statistics point towards a problem of weak instruments. The Hansen J-test also displays weak 
significance at the ten percent level. This problem is due to the low number of these actions. During 
the sample period, regulators only issue 46 Prompt corrective actions. 
Our Panel C of Table 4 reports on the second stage results. In a similar vein to the coefficients 
obtained with OLS, the instrumental variables regressions highlight that the magnitude of the effect on 
the macroeconomic environment depends on the type of enforcement action, and the coefficient 
magnitudes again differ between OLS and the estimates obtained in our instrumental variables 
regressions. Prompt corrective actions, despite being the type of action with the lowest frequency in 
our dataset, consistently display the largest effect, followed by Formal agreements, and Cease and 
desist orders. This pattern persists irrespective of whether we examine personal income growth, the 
number of establishments, or unemployment. These results are not surprising. Prompt corrective 
actions are the strongest types of enforcement actions, only occur rarely during the sample period, and 
‘hit’ banks hardest. The stronger effect of Formal agreements in comparison to Cease and desist orders 
is also intuitive. Formal agreements are issued with the consent of the institution, suggesting a strong 
commitment by the bank to address the problems and respond quickly. Banks have strong incentives to 
avoid public attention from Cease and desist orders and are keen to portray themselves as adjusting 
behavior in line with mutual agreements with the regulator rather than being subject to Cease and 
desist orders. Moreover, Formal agreements tend to occur prior to Cease and desist orders, and many 
problem banks are examined at a high frequency which results in additional enforcement actions 
following Formal agreements. Thus, these two coefficients may pick up compounding effects. While 
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Formal agreements are bilaterally agreed and are the first step to a change in conduct, Cease and desist 
orders may follow Formal agreements and have a lesser impact on banks. 
 [TABLE 4: Main results - The macroeconomic effects of different types of enforcement actions] 
3.2 Multi-market banks 
So far, we constrained our analyses to a sample of banks operating in single markets, denoted 
by county borders. This definition of the relevant market reduces the possibility that these banks make 
loans and create liquidity outside their local markets so that the causal effects of regulatory 
enforcement actions are most pronounced. From a regulatory and public policy perspective, however, 
large multi-market banks play a bigger role. We therefore now turn to an analysis of severe actions on 
both single-market and multi-market banks. In these tests, we extend our sample and additionally 
incorporate into the main sample observations for banks with multi-market operations to evaluate the 
incremental impact of enforcement actions on these banks. 
Table 5 presents the results. In Panel A, we find that personal income growth again contracts, 
and the magnitude of the key coefficient is larger than in the instrumental variables tests for single-
market banks. Likewise, the number of establishments also declines significantly in these tests. While 
the coefficient in the test for the unemployment rate remains positive, indicating an increase in 
unemployment, the t-statistic remains insignificant at conventional levels. The corresponding tests for 
the three different types of enforcement actions in Panel B of Table 5 also support the view that 
regulators’ actions affect banks whose operations span multiple markets. Formal agreements, Prompt 
corrective actions, and Cease and desist orders reduce personal income growth. Formal agreements 
and Cease and desist orders also significantly reduce the number of establishments, and, 
correspondingly, increase the unemployment rate. In most instances, the magnitude of the 
coefficients is greater than in the tests for single-market banks. This is in line with economic intuition: 
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multi-market banks have bigger operations that play a bigger role for the outcomes we study. The 
insignificance of Prompt corrective actions is a reflection of their low frequency.  
[TABLE 5: The macroeconomic effects of enforcement actions (multi-market banks included)] 
3.3 Crises 
Our main analyses exclude the crisis periods 2000-2002 and 2007-2009. An important question 
is whether regulatory enforcement actions are stronger or weaker during crisis periods. In other words, 
it is crucial to understand if regulators’ actions have ‘more bite’ during a crisis, or, alternatively, if 
interventions by regulators have a lesser effect during crises due to a variety of other government 
programs that coincide temporarily with enforcement actions. Prior work suggests a more limited 
effect of government interventions during crises. Berger, Bouwman, Kick and Schaeck (2010) show 
that interventions by German regulators into distressed banks have less pronounced effects on banks’ 
liquidity creation during crises, and Berger and Bouwman (2013) demonstrate that monetary policy 
has a weaker effect on bank liquidity creation during such times.  
Inspection of our descriptive statistics in Table 1 highlights that nearly 25 percent of all 
enforcement actions for the period 1999-2011 occur between 2007 and 2009. Moreover, Berger and 
Bouwman (2013) also classify the years 2000-2002, during which 19 percent of enforcement actions 
take place, as a crisis period.
11
 To understand whether the effects for the macroeconomy differ during 
crisis periods, we replicate our main regressions for the effects of Severe enforcement actions, and 
the three individual types of actions in Table 6. To preserve space, we only present the second stage 
results of the instrumental variables regressions. 
                                                          
11  
Berger and Bouwman (2013) classify the years 2007-2009 as a period of a banking crisis while they consider the years 
2000-2002 as a period with a market crisis, i.e., a crisis that occurred not in the banking sector but in the financial 
market with ramifications for the banking sector. In unreported tests, we obtain virtually identical results when we focus 
in our separate analysis for the crisis years only on the years 2007-2009. 
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Panel A highlights that Severe enforcement actions have indeed less ‘bite’ during crises, 
consistent with prior literature. None of the macroeconomic indicators is significantly affected by 
regulatory enforcement actions. This result is largely confirmed when we offer a breakdown into 
Formal agreements, Prompt corrective actions, and Cease and desist orders in Panel B of Table 6. 
Only the unemployment rate significantly increases during crises, although the statistical significance 
of the coefficient estimates is smaller than in our main analyses. In addition, this finding is also likely 
to be the result of other forms of government intervention during crises that aim to boost the 
macroeconomy and consequently work in the opposite direction of enforcement actions. Importantly, 
Berger and Roman (forthcoming) show that the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) during the 
recent crisis increased net job creation and net hiring establishments while it also decreased business 
and personal bankruptcies. 
[TABLE 6: Crisis periods: The macroeconomic effects of enforcement actions (2007-2009)] 
3.4 Mechanism: Bank lending and liquidity creation 
What might drive these findings for the adverse effects of enforcement actions on the 
macroeconomy? Two key candidates that have potential to trigger macroeconomic contractions are 
bank lending and liquidity creation. The latter measure is based on Berger and Bouwman (2009), who 
propose a three-step procedure to compute liquidity creation. First, using information on the category 
and maturity of banks’ assets and liabilities, we classify bank assets, liabilities and equity as liquid, 
semi-liquid, or illiquid depending on ease, cost, and time it takes customers to obtain liquid funds from 
the bank in case of liability items, and based on the ease, cost and time with which banks can dispose 
of their obligations in the case of assets. Second, we next assign weights of either +½, 0, or -½ to all 
activities classified in the first step. The weights correspond to liquidity creation theory, which asserts 
that banks create liquidity by converting illiquid assets into liquid liabilities, whilst by transforming 
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liquid assets into illiquid liabilities or equity, banks destroy liquidity. In the final step, we calculate 
how much liquidity each bank creates by combining and multiplying the activities classified in step 1 
with the weights from step 2.  
Our measure of liquidity creation is the preferred measure from Berger and Bouwman (2009) 
which classifies all activities other than loans by product category and maturity while loans are 
classified based on category due to data constraints. We also include off-balance sheet items, so that 
our measure of liquidity creation is identical to the measure termed ‘cat fat’ by Berger and Bouwman 
(2009). To verify our own computations do not differ from the original calculation of liquidity creation 
by Berger and Bouwman (2009), we examine the correlation between our measure ‘cat fat’ and the 
data reported on Christa Bouwman’s website.12 The correlation is 0.97 with a p-value of 0.00.  
The tests in Table 7 report regressions for these possible mechanisms through which the severe 
actions by regulators might affect the macroeconomy. We first analyze bank lending and then liquidity 
creation. To this end, we run instrumental variable regressions on the bank level for 7,025 banks and 
use the same exogenous instruments and control variables as in the tests above.
13
 Panel A presents the 
first stage and Panel B focuses on the second stage. 
In a similar vein to the first stage results shown above in Table 3 and 4, all instruments in Panel 
A enter significantly positively. The lagged differences of Less severe enforcement actions and also the 
lagged difference of severe enforcement actions significantly affect the probability of severe 
supervisory actions. Moreover, the diagnostics for the instruments confirm that our instruments satisfy 
both the relevance and the exclusion restrictions. 
                                                          
12
 See http://web.mit.edu/cbouwman/www/data.html.   
13  The number of enforcement actions in Table 7 is higher than those that enter the county-level analysis in Table 3 because 
in some counties multiple banks are subject to enforcement actions.  
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Our first set of tests in Panel B highlights contractions in total lending growth with decreases of 
8.3 percentage points in response to severe actions. A question that naturally arises then is whether all 
lending categories are affected equally or whether banks cut back their lending disproportionately for 
certain types of borrowers.
14
 The intuition is that loan categories reflect differences in risk choices and 
the most risky lending activities are likely to be most affected. To understand whether banks react in an 
intuitive manner, the next four columns show regressions with Corporate real estate loan growth, 
Residential real estate loan growth, Commercial and industrial loan growth, and with Consumer loan 
growth. The most standardized (Consumer lending), and the most risky lending activities (Commercial 
and industrial lending) are affected most prominently. The former contracts by 8 percentage points, 
and the latter is reduced by 10.2 percentage points. Corporate real estate lending is reduced by 6.6 
percentage points.
 15
   
While contractions in lending is a prime suspect, it only captures bank activities incompletely 
because off-balance sheet activities and lines of credit that are typically drawn down during a crisis are 
omitted when we examine lending activities (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). If lending contracts in 
response to severe enforcement actions, the measure which captures intermediation activities more 
comprehensively should not only also contract but the magnitude of the effect should be even more 
pronounced. We consequently also examine liquidity creation.   
The columns on the right hand side of Table 7 illustrate that our lending analysis 
underestimates the effects of enforcement actions. Banks reduce growth in liquidity creation by 12.1 
percentage points when regulators issue a severe action. Our decomposition into growth in liquidity 
creation on the asset side, on the liability side, and off the balance sheet indicates that the driver behind 
                                                          
14 
 Appendix A.2 provides an overview about the distribution of lending activities across loan categories.  
15  To rule out that banks which were supported by the Troubled Asset Relief Program confound our results as they may 
have been pressurized to lend, we remove in Appendix A.3 these banks. The results for lending and liquidity creation 
remain similar.  
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this economically large effect is a contraction in liquidity creation on the asset side of the balance sheet 
with a magnitude of minus 26.8 percentage points. The coefficient for liquidity creation on the liability 
side is small with 6.6 percentage points, and liquidity creation off the balance sheet is not affected.
16
  
 [TABLE 7: Mechanism: The effects of enforcement actions on bank lending and liquidity creation]  
3.5 Complementary evidence: Tests based on bank representation and external financial dependence 
We exploit two cross-sectional predictions to present further evidence that enforcement actions 
affect the macroeconomy. The first prediction arises from the evidence above that lending and liquidity 
creation are reduced once regulators issue enforcement actions. Provided that some counties have more 
banks than others, one would expect macroeconomic contractions to be more pronounced in counties 
with fewer banks because the scope for firms to find alternative sources of financing is limited. To test 
this idea, Panel A of Table 8 shows regressions that constrain the sample to counties with low (high) 
representation of banks, defined as the number of banks being below the 25
th
 (above the 75
th
) 
percentile of the number of banks in the sample. We present the second stage results to preserve space.  
The tests support this view. Personal income growth, the number of establishments, and the 
unemployment rate are significantly affected if bank representation is low, while the coefficients 
remain insignificant at conventional levels in counties where banks are well represented. 
Our second test further sharpens identification using data from the County Business Patterns 
database using information on the composition of industries within counties. If the contraction in the 
macroeconomy is indeed a result of declines in lending and liquidity creation, the effects are likely to 
be heterogeneous across counties because some counties have industries that depend heavily on 
external financing whereas other counties may have industries that depend less on bank funding 
                                                          
16  Our inferences of the hypothesized mechanism remain very similar when we replicate the tests for lending, liquidity 
creation, and their components for both single-market and multi-market banks. To preserve space, these additional 
analyses are relegated to the Appendix, Table A.4. 
- 24 - 
 
(Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel, 2007). In counties where industries are more reliant on external 
financing, the macroeconomy should contract more in response to enforcement actions. Panel B in 
Table 8 shows second stage regressions from instrumental variables models that constrain the sample 
to counties where external financial dependence, calculated as in Rajan and Zingales (1998), is below 
(above) the 25
th
 (75
th
) percentile of the distribution of this variable.
17
 The coefficient for severe actions 
behaves intuitively. Personal income growth, and the number of establishments contract significantly 
in counties where non-financial firms are strongly dependent on bank funding, and the unemployment 
rate increases significantly when regulators issue enforcement actions. In contrast, the effects are either 
insignificant or only weakly positively significant in counties with low dependence on external finance.  
[TABLE 8: Complementary evidence: Analyses conditioned on bank representation and external 
3.4 Long-run effects and the behavior of competitor banks 
Our next test focuses on long-run effects. Provided that enforcement actions aim to correct an 
overexpansion of bank activities that is typically temporary in nature to ensure safe, sound, and 
sustainable future banking, it seems plausible to expect that enforcement actions do not trigger long-
run effects for the real economy.   
To this end, we replicate the main regressions from Table 3 but forward the dependent variable 
by one, two, and three years. Panel A in Table 9 presents the results. The coefficients on the Severe 
actions dummy are rendered insignificant, except for the dummy on the number of establishments at 
year t+1 and at t+3 where we are still able to document a contraction. Taken together, these tests 
                                                          
17  
For brevity, we present in Table A.5 in the Appendix the corresponding analyses which include enforcement actions in 
banks that operate across county borders. This multi-market analysis yields similar results, and the macroeconomy 
remains more affected in areas with more limited bank representation and greater external financial dependence.  
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suggest that the adverse effects from supervisory actions for the macroeconomy are typically only of 
temporary nature and do not tend to cause long-run harm for the real sector.
18
   
A possible explanation for why there is relatively little evidence for effects of enforcement 
actions in the years following their announcement could be that distressed banks’ competitors pick up 
business opportunities. If this conjecture is true, we should be able to document positive effects of 
severe enforcement actions on lending and liquidity creation among the competitors. Panel B in Table 
9 shows regressions of the levels and growth rates of market shares in terms of lending and liquidity 
creation of the competitors from the same county. Competitor institutions do not significantly change 
their lending, and there are also no effects on their liquidity creation.
19
 Two explanations appear 
plausible. First, the relationship lending literature highlights the information sensitivity of banking. 
Repeated interaction between banks and borrowers may cause severe hold up problems and limits 
borrowers’ propensity to switch (Sharpe, 1990; Ongena and Smith, 2001). Second, competitor banks 
may become aware of the enforcement actions at their distressed counterparts as enforcement actions 
are public. To avoid being subject to supervisory scrutiny, they may consciously shy away from filling 
the gap and forego the opportunity to extend their market shares. 
   [TABLE 9: Long-run effects and the behavior of competitor institutions] 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The key result in this paper suggests that enforcement actions by bank supervisors trigger 
temporarily adverse effects for the real economy. These effects, however, typically last for one year 
only, and recede afterwards.  
                                                          
18  
Appendix Table A.6 reports the results of the long-run analysis for a sample comprising both single-market and multi-
market banks. The findings remain similar.  
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We document that Severe enforcement actions such as Formal agreements and Cease and desist 
orders imposed on single-market banks operating in U.S. counties reduce personal income growth rates 
by 0.7 percentage points, the number of establishments by 0.017 percentage points, and the 
unemployment rate increases by 0.157 percentage points, respectively. With growth rates averaging 
1.5 percent between 1999 and 2011 (excluding crisis periods) on the county level, these effects are 
considerable in terms of magnitude. These results tend to be even more pronounced when we extend 
our analysis and include multi-market banks but they are less strong during the crisis episodes. Further 
tests show that these real effects are brought about by declines in bank lending and liquidity creation. 
In line with the idea that lending and liquidity creation are the key transmission mechanism by which 
shocks that affect individual banks propagate to the real economy, we show that counties with fewer 
banks and counties whose industries exhibit a greater dependence on external financing are more 
affected. A final analysis which examines the behavior of the distressed institutions’ competitor banks 
offers no indication that they exploit the arising business opportunities and increase lending and 
liquidity creation.   
Our research builds on a quickly evolving literature that analyses the effects of enforcement 
actions on distressed banks. Unlike other studies that focus on the effects of enforcement actions on the 
micro level, the main innovation in our work is that we are the first to show that local economic 
indicators respond to such supervisory actions. Our empirical framework is uniquely suited to highlight 
this important macro-financial linkage, and offers a starting point for future research to investigate 
further knock-on effects of regulatory enforcement actions for the macroeconomy.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for enforcement actions 
Panel A: Time distribution of enforcement actions in U.S. counties 
Year Any action Severe actions Less severe actions 
Breakdown of Severe actions 
Formal agreements Cease and desist orders Prompt corrective actions 
1999 121 66 55 31 35 3 
2000 159 79 80 44 38 3 
2001 169 91 78 53 45 3 
2002 185 109 76 64 54 2 
2003 196 117 79 60 66 2 
2004 201 117 84 60 65 1 
2005 201 104 97 55 53 1 
2006 189 86 103 49 39 0 
2007 179 78 101 37 47 0 
2008 198 100 98 45 62 0 
2009 275 174 101 76 120 8 
2010 369 259 110 114 181 19 
2011 217 150 67 56 106 4 
Total  2659 1530 1129 744 911 46 
Panel B: Correlations between enforcement actions  
 
Severe actions Less severe actions Formal agreements Cease and desist orders Prompt corrective actions 
      Severe actions 1 
    
      
Less severe actions 0.211*** 1 
   
 
(0.00) 
    
      Formal agreements 0.690*** 0. 145*** 1 
  
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
   
      Cease and desist orders 0.765*** 0.192*** 0.145*** 1 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
      Prompt corrective actions 0.170*** 0.070*** 0.104*** 0.143*** 1 
 
(0.00) (0.59) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Notes. Panel A presents the number of enforcement actions issued by bank supervisors in U.S. counties in the years 1999-2011 for single-market banks. We report the total number 
of enforcement actions (Severe and Less severe actions), the number of Severe actions (Formal agreements, Cease and desist orders, and Prompt corrective actions), and the 
number of Less severe actions. This latter category consists of Actions against personnel and individuals, and other Civil money fines. During our sample period, we observe no 
single Deposit insurance threat in single-market banks. Deposit insurance threats would also be classified as Severe actions. Enforcement actions in single-market banks in 
Delaware and South Dakota states are excluded. Panel B presents a correlation matrix for the different types of enforcement actions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Min Max Source 
Dependent macroeconomic variables 
     
Real per capita personal income growth 9,435 0.015 0.036 -0.077 0.126 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
# of Establishments (per 100 inhabitants) 9,435 2.439 0.774 0.662 9.403 County Business Patterns database 
Unemployment rate (in %) 9,429 6.226 2.502 1.100 29.900 Bureau of Labor Statistics 
       
Dependent bank-level variables       
Total lending growth 33,678 0.069 0.189 -0.308 0.966 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
Corporate real estate loan growth 33,678 0.145 0.392 -0.468 2.176 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
Residential real estate loan growth 33,678 0.060 0.262 -0.412 1.325 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
Commercial and industrial loan growth 33,678 0.078 0.337 -0.538 1.600 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
Consumer loan growth 33,678 -0.020 0.276 -0.541 1.320 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
Liquidity creation growth 33,678 0.117 0.394 -1.000 1.666 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
Liquidity creation growth (asset side)  33,678 0.079 1.188 -4.317 4.592 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
Liquidity creation growth (liability side) 33,678 0.106 0.225 -0.335 1.192 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
Liquidity creation growth (off balance) 33,678 0.171 0.423 -0.559 1.794 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
       
Enforcement actions(lagged): county-level regressions      
 
Severe actions 9,435 0.085 0.278 0 1 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
Less severe actions 9,435 0.053 0.224 0 1 SNL Financial, authors’ calculation 
Formal agreements 9,435 0.042 0.200 0 1 SNL Financial 
Prompt corrective actions 9,435 0.003 0.056 0 1 SNL Financial 
Cease and desist orders 9,435 0.052 0.221 0 1 SNL Financial 
Enforcement actions(lagged): bank-level regressions       
Severe actions 33,678 0.021 0.144 0 1 SNL Financial 
Less severe actions 33,678 0.015 0.121 0 1 SNL Financial 
Formal agreements 33,678 0.010 0.102 0 1 SNL Financial 
Prompt corrective actions 33,678 0.000 0.021 0 1 SNL Financial 
Cease and desist orders 33,678 0.015 0.123 0 1 SNL Financial 
      
Control variables (lagged) 
     
HHI deposits (ln) 9,435 -1.434 0.492 -3.157 0.000 SNL Financial, authors' calculation 
Firm size (ln) 9,435 2.537 0.560 0.000 4.580 Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Z-score (ln) 9,435 4.540 0.986 -0.871 37.468 Authors’ calculation 
Z-score (ln) bank-level 33,678 4.104 1.113 -3.590 38.854 Authors’ calculation 
Notes. The table presents summary statistics, means, standard deviations, minima, maxima and the data sources for county-level variables (for counties with at least one single-
market bank) and bank-level variables (for single-market banks). Sample period: 1999-2011 (2000-2002 and 2007-2009 excluded).
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Table 3 
Main results: The macroeconomic effects of supervisory enforcement actions 
Panel A: OLS regressions    
Dependent variable Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
L.Severe actions -0.005*** -0.020*** 0.184** 
 (-3.423) (-3.736) (2.501) 
L.ln(Z-score) 0.002*** 0.003 -0.124*** 
 (4.872) (1.366) (-4.556) 
L.ln(HHI) 0.005 0.038*** -0.185 
 (1.559) (2.856) (-1.052) 
L.ln(Firm size) 0.007*** 0.030*** -0.588*** 
 (3.416) (5.074) (-7.969) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,435 9,435 9,429 
R-squared 0.035 0.344 0.720 
Counties 1,891 1,891 1,891 
Number of actions 798 798 796 
Panel B: IV regressions – First stage 
Dependent variable L. Severe actions L. Severe actions L. Severe actions 
L.ln(Z-score) -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
 (-2.536) (-2.536) (-2.524) 
L.ln(HHI) -0.047* -0.047* -0.048* 
 (-1.793) (-1.793) (-1.828) 
L.ln(Firm size) -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 (-3.129) (-3.129) (-3.124) 
LD.Less Severe actions 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (2.588) (2.588) (2.587) 
L2D.Less severe actions 0.032** 0.032** 0.032** 
 (1.990) (1.990) (1.990) 
L3D.Less severe actions 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 
 (3.338) (3.338) (3.339) 
LD.Severe actions 0.590*** 0.590*** 0.591*** 
 (44.219) (44.219) (44.230) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,435 9,435 9,429 
R-squared 0.366 0.366 0.367 
Counties 1,891 1,891 1,891 
Number of actions 798 798 796 
Panel C: IV regressions – Second stage 
Dependent variable Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
L.Severe actions -0.007*** -0.017** 0.157* 
 (-2.980) (-2.501) (1.792) 
L.ln(Z-score) 0.002*** 0.004 -0.124*** 
 (4.781) (1.393) (-4.545) 
L.ln(HHI) 0.005 0.040*** -0.198 
 (1.577) (2.989) (-1.148) 
L.ln(Firm size) 0.007*** 0.031*** -0.589*** 
 (3.348) (5.142) (-7.984) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,435 9,435 9,429 
R-squared 0.035 0.344 0.720 
Counties 1,891 1,891 1,891 
Number of actions 798 798 796 
Under-identification  282.7 282.7 282.9 
Weak-identification  499.6 499.6 499.9 
Hansen J-test 1.032 1.933 2.269 
p-value (Hansen) 0.794 0.586 0.518 
C-test (p-values)    
LD.Less Severe actions 0.9960 0.1799 0.2676 
L2D.Less Severe actions 0.3778 0.9797 0.4245 
L3D.Less Severe actions 0.6142 0.5890 0.1704 
LD.Severe actions 0.5677 0.2270 0.4043 
Notes. This table presents results of instrumental variable regressions of enforcement actions in single-market banks on per capita personal income growth, the 
number of establishments, and the unemployment rate, all measured at the county level. Panel A presents the OLS regressions, while Panel B and Panel C 
show the first-stage and second-stage results, respectively, for the IV regressions. Enforcement actions include Severe actions (dummy variable equal to one if 
Formal agreements, Cease and desist order, and/or Prompt corrective action is observed and zero otherwise); Less severe action is a dummy variable equal to 
one if enforcement actions against Personnel and individuals, and other Civil money fines are observed, or zero otherwise). Our regressions control for 
soundness in the local banking market, approximated by the Z-score (ln), concentration of the local banking market, measured by a county-level deposit-based 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and average firm size in the county (Firm size). Delaware and South Dakota counties excluded. The standard errors are 
clustered on the county level and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Financial crisis years (2000-2002 and 2007-2009) excluded. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4 
Main results: The macroeconomic effects of different types of enforcement actions 
Panel A: OLS regressions    
Dependent variable Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
L.Formal agreements -0.006**   -0.018***   0.127   
 (-2.458)   (-2.739)   (1.199)   
L. PCA  -0.010*   0.002   0.139  
  (-1.880)   (0.090)   (0.393)  
L.Cease & desist orders   -0.005***   -0.019***   0.279*** 
   (-3.338)   (-2.756)   (3.237) 
Controls, Year and County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,429 9,429 9,429 
R-squared 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.343 0.343 0.344 0.719 0.719 0.720 
Number of counties 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 
Panel B: First stage of IV regressions         
Dependent variable L.Formal 
Agreements 
L.PCA L.Cease & desist 
orders 
L.Formal 
Agreements 
L.PCA L.Cease & desist 
orders 
L.Formal 
Agreements 
L.PCA L.Cease & desist 
orders 
LD.Less Severe actions 0.021* 0.010* 0.042*** 0.021* 0.010* 0.042*** 0.021* 0.010* 0.042*** 
 (1.681) (1.686) (2.623) (1.681) (1.686) (2.623) (1.681) (1.686) (2.623) 
L2D.Less severe actions 0.010 0.003 0.027* 0.010 0.003 0.027* 0.010 0.003 0.027* 
 (0.810) (1.119) (1.932) (0.810) (1.119) (1.932) (0.810) (1.119) (1.932) 
L3D.Less severe actions 0.036** 0.009 0.044*** 0.036** 0.009 0.044*** 0.036** 0.009 0.044*** 
 (2.365) (1.437) (2.635) (2.365) (1.437) (2.635) (2.365) (1.437) (2.636) 
LD.Severe actions 0.266*** 0.010* 0.330*** 0.266*** 0.010* 0.330*** 0.266*** 0.010* 0.331*** 
 (14.408) (1.911) (17.137) (14.408) (1.911) (17.137) (14.413) (1.911) (17.146) 
Controls, Year and County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,429 9,429 9,429 
R-squared 0.143 0.015 0.197 0.143 0.015 0.197 0.143 0.015 0.198 
Number of counties 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 
Panel C: Second stage of IV regressions         
Dependent variable Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
L.Formal agreements -0.016***   -0.037**   0.363*   
 (-2.935)   (-2.468)   (1.838)   
L. PCA  -0.265*   -0.260   7.708*  
  (-1.892)   (-0.907)   (1.741)  
L.Cease and desist order   -0.013***   -0.029**   0.285* 
   (-2.950)   (-2.396)   (1.838) 
Controls, Year and County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,429 9,429 9,429 
R-squared 0.033 -0.103 0.033 0.343 0.326 0.344 0.719 0.673 0.720 
Number of counties 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 
Under-identification  130.8 7.119 158.1 130.8 7.119 158.1 130.8 7.119 158.4 
Weak-identification  52.74 1.796 76.47 52.74 1.796 76.47 52.77 1.796 76.56 
Hansen J-test 1.070 2.193 0.941 2.059 5.715 2.272 2.045 0.355 2.080 
p-value (Hansen) 0.784 0.533 0.816 0.560 0.126 0.518 0.563 0.949 0.556 
C-test (p-values)          
LD.Less Severe actions 0.9871 0.1835 0.8750 0.1594 0.0246 0.1474 0.2815 0.7086 0.3130 
L2D.Less Severe actions 0.3509 0.5661 0.4290 0.9057 0.8463 0.9881 0.4659 0.7603 0.4187 
L3D.Less Severe actions 0.6645 0.7569 0.6824 0.5204 0.4294 0.5528 0.1938 0.7249 0.1843 
LD. Severe actions 0.6367 0.2638 0.7364 0.2006 0.0191 0.1636 0.2195 0.8273 0.4379 
Notes. This table presents the results of OLS regressions of different types of enforcement actions in single-market banks on per capita personal income growth on the county level, the number of establishments, and the unemployment rate, all measured at the 
county level in Panel A. Panel B and Panel C Panel B show the first-stage and second-stage results, respectively, for the IV regressions. Delaware and South Dakota counties excluded. The standard errors are clustered on the county level and the associated t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Financial crisis years (2000-2002 and 2007-2009) excluded.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5 
The macroeconomic effects of enforcement actions (multi-market banks included) 
Notes. This table presents results of instrumental variable regressions of enforcement actions in single-market and multi-market banks on per capita personal income growth, the number of establishments, and the unemployment rate, all 
measured at the county level. Panel A presents the regressions considering any type of Severe actions (dummy variable equal to one if Formal agreements, Cease and desist order, and/or Prompt corrective action is observed and zero 
otherwise); Panel B presents the regressions considering the three types of Severe actions separately. Less severe action is a dummy variable equal to one if enforcement actions against Personnel and individuals, and other Civil money 
fines are observed, or zero otherwise). Our regressions control for soundness in the local banking market, approximated by the Z-score (ln), concentration of the local banking market, measured by a county-level deposit-based Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), and average firm size in the county (Firm size). Delaware and South Dakota counties excluded. The standard errors are clustered on the county level and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Financial crisis years (2000-2002 and 2007-2009) excluded. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel A: IV regressions – Second stage: All enforcement actions 
Dependent variable Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
L.Severe actions -0.014*** -0.032** 0.209 
 (-2.944) (-2.469) (1.334) 
L.ln(Z-score) 0.001*** 0.004*** -0.137*** 
 (4.018) (2.829) (-6.949) 
L.ln(HHI) 0.001 0.028** -0.064 
 (0.451) (2.406) (-0.507) 
L.ln(Firm size) 0.004*** 0.036*** -0.507*** 
 (3.027) (5.725) (-8.833) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,672 16,672 16,658 
R-squared 0.006 0.295 0.739 
Counties 2,894 2,894 2,894 
Number of actions 1,530 1,530 1,530 
Under-identification  177.0 177.0 177.4 
Weak-identification  79.36 79.36 79.50 
Hansen J-test 0.885 2.308 0.945 
p-value (Hansen) 0.829 0.511 0.814 
Panel B: IV regressions – Second stage: Category of enforcement actions 
Dependent variable Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
L.Formal agreements -0.022***   -0.046**   0.459*   
 (-2.912)   (-2.307)   (1.761)   
L. PCA  -0.133**   -0.229   2.356  
  (-2.110)   (-1.596)   (1.284)  
L.Cease & desist orders   -0.020***   -0.040**   0.409* 
   (-2.959)   (-2.342)   (1.813) 
L.Z-score (Ln) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.116*** -0.122*** -0.122*** 
 (3.352) (4.179) (4.650) (1.132) (1.364) (1.334) (-4.329) (-4.519) (-4.471) 
L. HHI (ln) 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.035** 0.032** 0.032** -0.135 -0.068 -0.104 
 (0.541) (-0.306) (0.167) (2.536) (2.037) (2.301) (-0.767) (-0.353) (-0.569) 
L.Firm size (ln) 0.005** 0.003 0.005** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.028*** -0.550*** -0.525*** -0.556*** 
 (2.149) (1.017) (2.335) (4.245) (3.224) (4.450) (-7.117) (-5.752) (-7.286) 
Year and county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,435 9, 435 9, 435 9,435 9,435 9,435 9,429 9,429 9,429 
R-squared -0.009 -0.067 0.008 0.334 0.315 0.341 0.717 0.712 0.718 
Counties 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 1,891 
Number of actions 744 46 911 744 46 911 744 46 911 
Under-identification  77.09 12.91 97.06 77.09 12.91 97.06 76.99 12.91 97.65 
Weak-identification  22.98 3.219 33.25 22.98 3.219 33.25 22.95 3.220 33.43 
Hansen J-test 0.486 1.511 0.274 2.620 3.479 2.391 2.098 2.647 1.978 
p-value (Hansen) 0.922 0.680 0.965 0.454 0.324 0.495 0.552 0.449 0.577 
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Table 6 
Crisis episodes: The macroeconomic effects of supervisory enforcement actions: 2000-2002 and 2007-2009 
Notes. This table presents results of instrumental variable regressions of enforcement actions in single-market banks on per capita personal income growth, the number of establishments, and the unemployment rate, all measured at the county level. Panel A 
presents the regressions considering any type of Severe actions (dummy variable equal to one if Formal agreements, Cease and desist order, and/or Prompt corrective action is observed and zero otherwise); Panel B presents the regressions considering the 
three types of Severe actions separately. Less severe action is a dummy variable equal to one if enforcement actions against Personnel and individuals, and other Civil money fines are observed, or zero otherwise). Our regressions control for soundness in 
the local banking market, approximated by the Z-score (ln), concentration of the local banking market, measured by a county-level deposit-based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), and average firm size in the county (Firm size). Delaware and South 
Dakota counties excluded. The standard errors are clustered on the county level and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A: IV regressions – Second stage: All enforcement actions 
Dependent variable Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
L.Severe actions -0.003 -0.005 0.050 
 (-0.634) (-0.485) (0.407) 
L.ln(Z-score) 0.001 -0.001 -0.115*** 
 (1.272) (-0.295) (-4.560) 
L.ln(HHI) 0.011*** -0.019 -0.092 
 (3.477) (-1.420) (-0.904) 
L.ln(Firm size) 0.001 0.009 -0.550*** 
 (0.388) (1.155) (-6.044) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,329 8,329 8,329 
R-squared 0.369 0.138 0.718 
Counties 1,996 1,996 1,996 
Number of actions 420 420 420 
Under-identification  148.5 148.5 148.5 
Weak-identification  346.3 346.3 346.3 
Hansen J-test 0.877 1.781 0.104 
p-value (Hansen) 0.349 0.182 0.747 
Panel B: IV regressions – Second stage: Category of enforcement actions 
Dependent variable Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
L.Formal agreements -0.006   -0.009   0.102   
 (-0.689)   (-0.415)   (0.424)   
L. PCA  -0.175   -0.335   3.091  
  (-0.571)   (-0.488)   (0.384)  
L.Cease & desist orders   -0.005   -0.012   0.098 
   (-0.569)   (-0.560)   (0.389) 
L.Z-score (Ln) 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.115*** 
 (1.269) (1.358) (1.272) (-0.293) (-0.218) (-0.298) (-4.560) (-4.523) (-4.559) 
L. HHI (ln) 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.093 -0.082 -0.092 
 (3.488) (3.055) (3.476) (-1.411) (-1.475) (-1.427) (-0.914) (-0.772) (-0.900) 
L.Firm size (ln) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.009 -0.549*** -0.552*** -0.551*** 
 (0.367) (0.448) (0.403) (1.145) (1.185) (1.165) (-6.035) (-6.032) (-6.049) 
Year and county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 8,329 
R-squared 0.369 0.353 0.369 0.138 0.131 0.138 0.718 0.715 0.718 
Counties 1,996 1,996 1,996 1,996 1,996 1,996 1,996 1,996 1,996 
Number of actions 219 6 226 219 6 226 219 6 226 
Under-identification  72.49 3.008 70.57 72.49 3.008 70.57 72.49 3.008 70.57 
Weak-identification  62.91 1.259 55.76 62.91 1.259 55.76 62.91 1.259 55.76 
Hansen J-test 0.810 0.902 0.947 1.854 1.751 1.691 0.0905 0.110 0.120 
p-value (Hansen) 0.368 0.342 0.331 0.173 0.186 0.193 0.764 0.740 0.729 
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Table 7 
Mechanism: The effects of enforcement actions on bank lending and liquidity creation 
Panel A: First stage 
    Bank lending    Bank liquidity creation  
Dependent variable: 
 
 L.Severe 
actions 
L.Severe 
actions 
L.Severe 
actions 
L.Severe 
actions 
L.Severe 
actions 
L.Severe 
actions 
L.Severe 
actions 
L.Severe 
actions 
L.Severe     
actions 
LD.Less severe actions  0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
  (2.676) (2.676) (2.676) (2.676) (2.676) (2.676) (2.676) (2.676) (2.676) 
L2D.Less severe actions  0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
  (2.739) (2.739) (2.739) (2.739) (2.739) (2.739) (2.739) (2.739) (2.739) 
L3D.Less severe actions  0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
  (3.258) (3.258) (3.258) (3.258) (3.258) (3.258) (3.258) (3.258) (3.258) 
LD.Severe actions  0.625*** 0.625*** 0.625*** 0.625*** 0.625*** 0.625*** 0.625*** 0.625*** 0.625*** 
  (40.919) (40.919) (40.919) (40.919) (40.919) (40.919) (40.919) (40.919) (40.919) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.397 0.397 0.397 0.397 0.397 0.397 0.397 0.397 0.397 
Panel B: Second stage 
Dependent variable  Total lending 
growth 
Corporate real 
estate loan 
growth 
Residential real 
estate loan 
growth 
Commercial 
and industrial 
loan growth 
Consumer loan 
growth 
Liquidity 
creation growth 
Liquidity 
creation growth 
(asset side)  
Liquidity 
creation growth 
(liability side) 
Liquidity creation 
growth (off 
balance) 
L.Severe actions  -0.083*** -0.066* -0.039 -0.102*** -0.080*** -0.121*** -0.268** -0.066*** -0.045 
  (-4.590) (-1.804) (-1.519) (-3.319) (-2.601) (-3.222) (-2.294) (-2.795) (-1.021) 
L.ln(Z-score)  0.013*** 0.006** 0.005** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 
  (8.107) (2.115) (2.349) (5.343) (2.971) (5.974) (3.515) (6.934) (5.862) 
L.ln(HHI)  0.013 0.003 0.007 0.022 -0.022 0.036* -0.010 0.017 0.057*** 
  (1.278) (0.161) (0.482) (1.286) (-1.449) (1.906) (-0.159) (1.434) (2.767) 
L.ln(Firm Size)  0.009* 0.005 0.005 -0.009 -0.007 0.002 -0.029 0.009 0.029** 
  (1.876) (0.394) (0.803) (-0.940) (-1.037) (0.189) (-0.749) (1.535) (2.123) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  33,678 33,678 33,678 33,678 33,678 33,678 33,678 33,678 33,678 
R-squared  0.039 0.018 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.019 0.004 0.081 0.029 
Banks  7,025 7,025 7,025 7,025 7,025 7,025 7,025 7,025 7,025 
Number of actions  892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 892 
Under-identification  295.1 295.1 295.1 295.1 295.1 295.1 295.1 295.1 295.1 
Weak-identification  424.0 424.0 424.0 424.0 424.0 424.0 424.0 424.0 424.0 
Hansen J-test  2.512 3.618 0.470 6.532 0.582 5.977 4.346 2.169 5.825 
p-value (Hansen)  0.473 0.306 0.926 0.0884 0.901 0.113 0.226 0.538 0.120 
Notes. This table presents the results of IV regressions of enforcement actions in single-market banks on lending, liquidity creation growth, and their components. Panel A presents the first stage regressions, 
and Panel B shows the second stage results. The standard errors are clustered on the bank level and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Financial crisis years (2000-2002 and 2007-2009) 
excluded. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8  
Complementary evidence: Analyses conditioned on bank representation and external financial dependence 
Panel A: Bank representation  
Dependent variable  Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
Sample conditioned on 
counties where  
bank 
representation 
< p25 
bank 
representation  
>p75 
bank 
representation  
<  p25 
bank 
representation 
 > p75 
bank 
representation 
<  p25 
bank 
representation  
> p75 
L.Severe actions -0.017*** -0.001 -0.031** -0.007 0.330* 0.004 
 (-3.509) (-0.376) (-2.193) (-0.535) (1.706) (0.030) 
L.ln(Z-score) 0.002*** -0.003 0.000 0.027** -0.083*** -0.738*** 
 (4.492) (-0.982) (0.028) (2.264) (-4.899) (-5.613) 
L.ln(HHI) 0.001 -0.004 0.024 0.000 -0.112 0.059 
 (0.200) (-0.747) (0.876) (0.020) (-0.479) (0.099) 
L.ln(Firm size) 0.003 0.008 0.021** 0.001 -0.412*** -0.654* 
 (1.179) (0.768) (2.568) (0.035) (-4.239) (-1.860) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,184 726 4,184 726 4,182 724 
R-squared 0.032 0.202 0.259 0.488 0.699 0.826 
Counties 918 154 918 154 918 154 
Number of actions 234 197 234 197 234 195 
Under-identification  79.99 50.22 79.99 50.22 79.99 50.56 
Weak-identification  106.6 84.08 106.6 84.08 106.6 84.26 
Hansen J-test 4.627 3.758 4.425 2.915 0.557 5.616 
p-value (Hansen) 0.201 0.289 0.219 0.405 0.906 0.132 
Panel B: External financial dependence  
Dependent variable  Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
Sample conditioned on 
counties where  
external 
financial 
dependence  
<  p25 
external  
financial 
dependence  
> p75 
external 
financial 
dependence  
<  p25 
external 
financial 
dependence  
> p75 
external 
financial 
dependence <  
p25 
external  
financial 
dependence > 
p75 
L.Severe actions -0.008 -0.016*** 0.009 -0.027* 0.350* 0.496*** 
 (-1.326) (-2.939) (0.738) (-1.882) (1.832) (2.583) 
L.ln(Z-score) -0.002 0.002*** 0.005 0.001 -0.217*** -0.072* 
 (-0.961) (2.982) (1.418) (0.257) (-3.196) (-1.823) 
L.ln(HHI) -0.002 0.005 -0.001 0.088*** -0.618 -0.837*** 
 (-0.307) (0.792) (-0.023) (2.736) (-1.576) (-3.615) 
L.ln(Firm size) -0.002 0.015** 0.019** 0.047*** -0.087 -0.826*** 
 (-0.706) (2.551) (2.524) (2.733) (-0.702) (-4.934) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,547 2,779 1,547 2,779 1,547 2,779 
R-squared 0.020 0.046 0.317 0.222 0.777 0.640 
Counties 369 611 369 611 369 611 
Number of actions 109 235 109 235 109 235 
Under-identification  47.95 81.26 47.95 81.26 47.95 81.26 
Weak-identification  83.77 117.2 83.77 117.2 83.77 117.2 
Hansen J-test 5.377 1.701 2.537 3.942 4.775 3.294 
p-value (Hansen) 0.146 0.637 0.469 0.268 0.189 0.348 
Notes. This table presents complementary evidence that exploits the cross-sectional predictions that the macroeconomic effects should be more pronounced in counties with a greater bank 
representation in Panel A, and in counties where firms display greater external financial dependence, calculated using the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of external financial dependence 
in Panel B. The table only presents the results from the second stage IV estimation to preserve space and the corresponding diagnostics. We show the results for all three dependent variables 
and condition the regressions on counties with high (low) representation of banks, defined as the number of banks being below the 25th percentile (above the 75th percentile) in Panel A. Panel 
B conditions the regressions on counties whose firms have low (high) external financial dependence, defined as being below the 25th percentile of the variable (above the 75th percentile of the 
variable). These regressions include the control variables used in Table 3. First-stage results are available upon request. In the last four rows of each panel we report the p-values of the C-tests. 
All regressions cluster standard errors on the county level and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Financial crisis years (2000-2002 and 2007-2009) excluded. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9 
Long-run effects and the behavior of competitor institutions 
 Panel A: Long-run effects 
Dependent variable Personal income 
growth 
# of 
Establishments  
Unemployment 
rate 
Personal income 
growth 
# of 
Establishments  
Unemployment 
rate 
Personal income 
growth 
# of 
Establishments  
Unemployment  
rate 
 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+2 t+2 t+2 t+3 t+3 t+3 
          
L.Severe actions 0.000 -0.016* 0.047 0.001 0.005 0.041 0.008 -0.019** 0.176 
 (0.042) (-1.844) (0.479) (0.115) (0.474) (0.530) (1.541) (-2.370) (1.428) 
L.ln(Z-score) 0.001** 0.004 -0.105*** -0.001 -0.003 0.136*** -0.001 -0.005 0.211*** 
 (2.092) (1.403) (-4.898) (-0.478) (-0.700) (4.920) (-0.487) (-1.330) (3.798) 
L.ln(HHI) 0.024*** 0.048*** -0.288* 0.010 0.005 0.135 0.012** 0.015 -0.106 
 (6.264) (3.561) (-1.922) (1.414) (0.401) (1.402) (2.047) (1.164) (-0.614) 
L.ln(Firm size) 0.005* 0.020*** -0.323*** 0.005 -0.009 0.076 0.003 0.005 0.122 
 (1.861) (3.092) (-4.144) (1.529) (-1.420) (0.873) (0.958) (0.795) (0.856) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,120 8,120 8,114 6,716 6,716 6,710 6,719 6,719 6,716 
R-squared 0.086 0.371 0.711 0.123 0.080 0.318 0.380 0.347 0.772 
Countiess 1,774 1,774 1,774 1,758 1,758 1,758 1,761 1,761 1,761 
Under-identification 206.6 206.6 206.0 123.4 123.4 122.9 123.4 123.4 122.9 
Weak-identification 307.9 307.9 307.1 226.6 226.6 225.8 226.6 226.6 223.3 
Hansen-J-test 0.212 0.922 2.227 0.807 2.731 3.476 3.080 2.720 5.723 
p-value (Hansen) 0.976 0.820 0.527 0.848 0.435 0.324 0.379 0.437 0.126 
 Panel B: Behavior of competitor banks 
Dependent variable Total lending (market share) Liquidity creation (market share) Total lending growth Liquidity creation growth 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
L.Severe actions -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.005 -0.012 
 (-0.885) (-0.119) (-0.171) (-0.709) (-0.642) (-1.520) (-1.957) (-0.934) (0.071) (-0.430) (0.323) (-1.017) 
L.ln(Z-score) -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.853) (-0.980) (-1.364) (-1.800) (-1.855) (-2.688) (-1.656) (0.065) (-1.067) (-0.784) (-0.352) (-0.759) 
L.ln(HHI) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.004** -0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.249) (-1.215) (-1.119) (-1.485) (-1.249) (-0.818) (-0.750) (-0.041) (-0.476) (-2.301) (-0.329) (-0.063) 
L.ln(Firm size) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.004 0.002 
 (2.111) (2.110) (1.803) (1.973) (2.361) (2.047) (-1.844) (0.469) (-0.698) (-0.285) (0.849) (0.825) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,581 24,040 23,170 27,581 24,040 23,170 27,581 24,040 23,170 27,581 24,040 23,170 
R-squared 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Banks 5,738 5,444 5,259 5,738 5,444 5,259 5,738 5,444 5,259 5,738 5,444 5,259 
Under-identification 164.0 123.2 115.8 164.0 123.2 115.8 164.0 123.2 115.8 164.0 123.2 115.8 
Weak-identification 242.7 241.1 239.2 242.7 241.1 239.2 242.7 241.1 239.2 242.7 241.1 239.2 
Hansen-J-test 1.345 4.202 4.067 2.129 3.954 3.204 3.832 1.440 0.189 6.683 3.984 1.500 
p-value (Hansen) 0.719 0.241 0.254 0.546 0.267 0.361 0.280 0.696 0.979 0.0827 0.263 0.682 
Notes. Panel A presents instrumental variable regressions that establish the long-run effects of severe enforcement actions on personal income growth, the number of establishments, and the unemployment rate. The 
dependent variables are forwarded one, two, and three years. Panel B examines the behavior of competitor banks’ market shares in terms of total lending and liquidity creation, and the corresponding growth rates for one, 
two, and three years following the announcements of severe enforcement actions using instrumental variable regressions. The control variables discussed in the notes to Table 3 are included. We only show second-stage 
results. First-stage results are available upon request. The standard errors are clustered on the county and bank level for Panel A and Panel B, respectively, and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Financial 
crisis years (2000-2002 and 2007-2009) excluded.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Figure 1 
Local banking markets in the U.S. (Development over time) 
Figure 1 presents the location and number of counties in which single-market banks operate, at the beginning and the end of the sample period 
(1999 and 2011). Counties shaded in dark blue represent counties in which all operating banks are single-market banks. Counties shaded in 
dark grey color are counties where at least one single-market is located. All other counties are shaded in light grey color. 
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Figure 2 
Enforcement actions in U.S. counties (Development over time) 
Figure 2 presents the location and number of counties in which single-market banks were subject to enforcement actions. We present their 
location and number at the beginning and the end of the sample period (year 1999 and 2011). Counties shaded in red represent intervention 
counties. All other counties are shaded in light grey color. 
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Appendix 
The real effects of banking supervision: Evidence from enforcement actions   
 
Table A.1 Relationship between less severe and severe enforcement actions 
Dependent variable Less severe enforcement actions Severe actions 
D.Severe actions 0.009  
 (0.756)  
D.Less severe enforcement action  0.035*** 
  (3.019) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes 
Observations 38,558 38,558 
R-squared 0.002 0.016 
Number of banks 7,062 7,062 
Notes. This table presents linear probability regressions for the probability of observing Less severe enforcement actions as a function of changes (i.e. first-difference of) in severe enforcement actions, and of 
the probability of observing severe enforcement actions as a function of changes (i.e. first-difference of) Less severe enforcement actions to understand the sequencing of different types of enforcement actions. 
The standard errors are clustered on the bank level and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
The real effects of banking supervision: Evidence from enforcement actions   
Table A.2 Summary statistics for selected loan categories 
Year Corporate real estate loans Residential real estate loans C&I loans Consumer loans 
 
(% of total loans) (% of total loans) (% of total loans) (% of total loans) 
1999 0.156 0.308 0.162 0.147 
2000 0.166 0.303 0.166 0.139 
2001 0.173 0.303 0.166 0.133 
2002 0.184 0.298 0.162 0.124 
2003 0.199 0.295 0.157 0.114 
2004 0.212 0.287 0.154 0.105 
2005 0.217 0.284 0.151 0.095 
2006 0.221 0.275 0.149 0.088 
2007 0.222 0.267 0.149 0.082 
2008 0.223 0.261 0.150 0.078 
2009 0.237 0.268 0.146 0.072 
2010 0.252 0.277 0.139 0.070 
2011 0.260 0.281 0.137 0.067 
Average 0.208 0.286 0.153 0.102 
Notes. This table presents statistics for the distribution of lending. The different types of loans are scaled by total loans per year.  
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Appendix 
The real effects of banking supervision: Evidence from enforcement actions   
Table A.3 Additional Robustness Test - Excluding banks which received TARP capital support                                                                                             
Dependent variable Total lending growth  Liquidity creation growth 
L.Severe actions -0.080***  -0.113*** 
 (-4.447)  (-3.061) 
L.ln(Z-score) 0.013***  0.017*** 
 (8.148)  (6.028) 
L.ln(HHI) 0.013  0.037* 
 (1.247)  (1.922) 
L.ln(Firm Size) 0.008*  0.002 
 (1.773)  (0.168) 
Year FE Yes  Yes 
Bank FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 32,880  32,880 
R-squared 0.039  0.019 
Number of banks 6,262  6,262 
Under-identification 293.3  293.3 
Weak-identification 419.2  419.2 
Hansen-J-test 2.390  5.821 
p-value (Hansen) 0.495  0.121 
Notes. This table presents additional results of instrumental variable regressions of enforcement actions on single-market banks. We exclude banks which received capital support from the Troubled Asset Relief 
Programme. The explanatory variables are explained in the Notes to Table 3. We only show the second-stage results. The standard errors are clustered on the bank level and the associated t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Financial crisis years (2000-2002 and 2007-2009) excluded. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The real effects of banking supervision: Evidence from enforcement actions   
Table A.4 Mechanism: The effects of enforcement actions on bank lending and liquidity creation (multi-market banks included) 
Panel A: First stage 
    Bank lending    Bank liquidity creation  
Dependent variable: 
L.Severe actions 
 Total lending 
growth 
Corporate real 
estate loan 
growth 
Residential real 
estate loan 
growth 
Commercial 
and industrial 
loan growth 
Consumer loan 
growth 
Liquidity 
creation growth 
Liquidity 
creation growth 
(asset side)  
Liquidity 
creation growth 
(liability side) 
Liquidity creation 
growth (off 
balance) 
LD.Less severe actions  0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 0.029** 
  (2.227) (2.227) (2.227) (2.227) (2.227) (2.227) (2.227) (2.227) (2.227) 
L2D.Less severe actions  0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
  (2.810) (2.810) (2.810) (2.810) (2.810) (2.810) (2.810) (2.810) (2.810) 
L3D.Less severe actions  0.036** 0.036** 0.036** 0.036** 0.036** 0.036** 0.036** 0.036** 0.036** 
  (2.559) (2.559) (2.559) (2.559) (2.559) (2.559) (2.559) (2.559) (2.559) 
LD.Severe actions  0.570*** 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.570*** 
  (32.838) (32.838) (32.838) (32.838) (32.838) (32.838) (32.838) (32.838) (32.838) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 
Panel B: Second stage 
L.Severe actions  -0.092*** -0.080** -0.044 -0.109*** -0.080** -0.132*** -0.292** -0.072*** -0.053 
  (-4.552) (-1.998) (-1.578) (-3.241) (-2.410) (-3.235) (-2.334) (-2.837) (-1.097) 
L.ln(Z-score)  0.012*** 0.005* 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.016*** 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 
  (8.102) (1.748) (2.587) (5.463) (2.945) (5.766) (3.409) (6.377) (5.989) 
L.ln(HHI)  0.004 -0.009 0.000 0.012 -0.021 0.027* 0.012 0.011 0.049*** 
  (0.481) (-0.528) (0.022) (0.773) (-1.528) (1.655) (0.223) (1.097) (2.678) 
L.ln(Firm Size)  0.004 -0.000 -0.002 -0.008 -0.012* -0.001 -0.040 0.008 0.029** 
  (0.930) (-0.025) (-0.329) (-0.935) (-1.884) (-0.071) (-1.225) (1.417) (2.543) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  40,147 40,147 40,147 40,147 40,147 40,147 40,147 40,147 40,147 
R-squared  0.047 0.023 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.024 0.005 0.084 0.034 
Banks  7,844 7,844 7,844 7,844 7,844 7,844 7,844 7,844 7,844 
Number of actions  1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 1,547 
Under-identification  272.5 272.5 272.5 272.5 272.5 272.5 272.5 272.5 272.5 
Weak-identification  280.1 280.1 280.1 280.1 280.1 280.1 280.1 280.1 280.1 
Hansen J-test  3.110 3.973 0.414 9.165 0.506 7.737 3.653 1.818 5.989 
p-value (Hansen)  0.375 0.264 0.937 0.0272 0.918 0.0518 0.302 0.611 0.112 
Notes. This table presents the results of IV regressions of enforcement actions in single-market and multi-market banks on lending, liquidity creation growth, and their components. Panel A presents the first 
stage regressions, and Panel B shows the second stage results. The standard errors are clustered on the bank level and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Financial crisis years (2000-2002 and 
2007-2009) excluded. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.5– Bank Representation and External Financial Dependence (multi-market banks included)  
Panel A: Bank representation  
Dependent variable  Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
Sample conditioned on 
counties where  
bank 
representation 
< p25 
bank 
representation  
>p75 
bank 
representation  
<  p25 
bank 
representation 
 > p75 
bank 
representation 
<  p25 
bank 
representation  
> p75 
L.Severe actions -0.021*** -0.000 -0.055** 0.006 0.403 -0.072 
 (-2.922) (-0.023) (-2.518) (0.195) (1.401) (-0.213) 
L.ln(Z-score) 0.002*** -0.004 0.002 0.031*** -0.109*** -0.738*** 
 (4.033) (-1.146) (0.918) (3.024) (-5.555) (-5.570) 
L.ln(HHI) -0.004 -0.004 -0.013 0.004 0.218 0.014 
 (-0.898) (-0.730) (-0.762) (0.219) (1.201) (0.022) 
L.ln(Firm size) 0.004* 0.009 0.028*** 0.000 -0.475*** -0.690* 
 (1.809) (0.905) (3.852) (0.011) (-5.750) (-1.937) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,644 728 7,644 728 7,638 726 
R-squared -0.012 0.203 0.247 0.482 0.729 0.827 
Counties 1,533 154 1,533 154 1,533 154 
Under-identification  60.22 22.74 60.22 22.74 60.21 22.98 
Weak-identification  29.43 9.769 29.43 9.769 29.43 9.795 
Hansen J-test 1.234 3.818 6.751 3.078 0.779 5.471 
p-value (Hansen) 0.745 0.282 0.0803 0.380 0.854 0.140 
Panel B: External financial dependence  
Dependent variable  Personal income growth # of Establishments Unemployment rate 
Sample conditioned on 
counties where  
external 
financial 
dependence  
<  p25 
external  
financial 
dependence  
> p75 
external 
financial 
dependence  
<  p25 
external financial 
dependence  
> p75 
external 
financial 
dependence <  
p25 
external  
financial 
dependence > 
p75 
L.Severe actions -0.009 -0.027** 0.002 -0.025 0.556** 0.515 
 (-1.148) (-2.567) (0.143) (-0.950) (2.139) (1.522) 
L.ln(Z-score) 0.002 0.001** 0.002 0.002 -0.158** -0.077** 
 (1.473) (2.429) (0.805) (0.549) (-2.226) (-2.347) 
L.ln(HHI) -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.038 -0.347 -0.399** 
 (-0.324) (-0.360) (0.193) (1.549) (-1.101) (-2.065) 
L.ln(Firm size) -0.002 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.060*** -0.096 -0.937*** 
 (-0.924) (3.362) (2.990) (3.854) (-0.875) (-6.744) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,507 3,848 2,507 3,848 2,507 3,848 
R-squared 0.019 -0.027 0.307 0.249 0.780 0.654 
Counties 570 793 570 793 570 793 
Under-identification  36.96 47.86 36.96 47.86 36.96 47.86 
Weak-identification  21.74 19.52 21.74 19.52 21.74 19.52 
Hansen J-test 3.106 2.444 0.739 3.643 2.951 3.217 
p-value (Hansen) 0.376 0.486 0.864 0.303 0.399 0.359 
Notes. Similar to Table 8, this table presents complementary evidence that exploits the cross-sectional predictions that the macroeconomic effects should be more pronounced in 
counties with a greater bank representation in Panel A, and in counties where firms display greater external financial dependence, calculated using the Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
measure of external financial dependence in Panel B. Unlike Table 8, we use multi-market banks as well as single-market banks. The table only presents the results from the second 
stage IV estimation to preserve space and the corresponding diagnostics. We show the results for all three dependent variables and condition the regressions on counties with high (low) 
representation of banks, defined as the number of banks being below the 25th percentile (above the 75th percentile) in Panel A. Panel B conditions the regressions on counties whose 
firms have low (high) external financial dependence, defined as being below the 25th percentile of the variable (above the 75th percentile of the variable). These regressions include the 
control variables used in Table 3. First-stage results are available upon request. In the last four rows of each panel we report the p-values of the C-tests. All regressions cluster standard 
errors on the county level and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses.. Financial crisis years (2000-2002 and 2007-2009) excluded. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.6 Long-run effects and the behavior of competitor institutions (multi-market banks included) 
 Panel A: Long-run effects 
Dependent variable Personal income 
growth 
# of 
Establishments  
Unemployment 
rate 
Personal income 
growth 
# of 
Establishments  
Unemployment 
rate 
Personal income 
growth 
# of 
Establishments  
Unemployment  
rate 
 t+1 t+1 t+1 t+2 t+2 t+2 t+3 t+3 t+3 
L.Severe actions 0.001 -0.030** 0.029 -0.001 0.003 0.066 0.009 -0.028** 0.357* 
 (0.147) (-2.041) (0.172) (-0.075) (0.233) (0.601) (1.149) (-2.391) (1.932) 
L.ln(Z-score) 0.001* 0.006*** -0.118*** -0.002* -0.002 0.112*** -0.000 -0.003 0.142*** 
 (1.857) (2.839) (-6.833) (-1.790) (-0.471) (5.225) (-0.372) (-1.012) (3.629) 
L.ln(HHI) 0.018*** 0.044*** -0.251** 0.010** 0.018 0.064 0.007* 0.009 0.027 
 (6.189) (3.494) (-2.273) (2.166) (1.226) (0.865) (1.657) (0.903) (0.208) 
L.ln(Firm size) 0.004** 0.023*** -0.338*** 0.003 -0.010 0.111** 0.003 -0.002 0.153 
 (2.146) (2.926) (-5.583) (1.203) (-1.345) (1.983) (1.522) (-0.294) (1.614) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,736 13,736 13,722 11,162 11,162 11,148 11,170 11,170 11,163 
R-squared 0.082 0.308 0.726 0.115 0.067 0.344 0.352 0.306 0.788 
Number of banks 2,828 2,828 2,828 2,808 2,808 2,808 2,815 2,815 2,815 
Under-identification 136.6 136.6 135.8 88.09 88.09 87.53 88.10 88.10 87.67 
Weak-identification 61.88 61.88 61.41 48.03 48.03 47.66 48.03 48.03 47.67 
Hansen-J-test 0.527 2.123 1.895 0.749 1.958 2.087 4.207 2.898 5.621 
p-value (Hansen) 0.913 0.547 0.595 0.862 0.581 0.555 0.240 0.408 0.132 
 Panel B: Behavior of competitor banks 
Dependent variable Total lending (market share) Liquidity creation (market share) Total lending growth Liquidity creation growth 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
L.Severe actions -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 -0.010 
 (-0.839) (-0.223) (-0.105) (-0.678) (-0.647) (-1.097) (-1.162) (-0.116) (0.445) (0.177) (0.339) (-0.805) 
L.ln(Z-score) -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-2.040) (-1.137) (-1.606) (-2.043) (-2.023) (-2.727) (-2.812) (-0.133) (-1.001) (-0.774) (-0.171) (-0.821) 
L.ln(HHI) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 
 (-1.163) (-0.938) (-1.162) (-0.859) (-1.255) (-0.837) (0.810) (0.394) (-0.721) (-1.347) (-0.372) (0.004) 
L.ln(Firm size) 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.004 0.001 
 (0.395) (1.222) (1.801) (0.352) (1.278) (1.428) (-1.791) (0.646) (0.058) (-1.025) (1.052) (0.508) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,558 28,173 27,122 32,558 28,173 27,122 32,558 28,173 27,122 32,558 28,173 27,122 
R-squared 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of banks 6,540 6,216 5,987 6,540 6,216 5,987 6,540 6,216 5,987 6,540 6,216 5,987 
Under-identification 146.0 112.3 105.6 146.0 112.3 105.6 146.0 112.3 105.6 146.0 112.3 105.6 
Weak-identification 131.5 125.8 121.0 131.5 125.8 121.0 131.5 125.8 121.0 131.5 125.8 121.0 
Hansen-J-test 1.244 4.435 3.911 1.686 3.781 3.260 5.400 0.600 1.233 7.561 3.237 1.966 
p-value (Hansen) 0.743 0.218 0.271 0.640 0.286 0.353 0.145 0.896 0.745 0.0560 0.357 0.579 
Notes. Panel A presents instrumental variable regressions that establish the long-run effects of severe enforcement actions on personal income growth, the number of establishments, and the unemployment rate. The dependent variables are 
forwarded one, two, and three years. Panel B examines the behavior of competitor banks’ market shares in terms of total lending and liquidity creation, and the corresponding growth rates for one, two, and three years following the 
announcements of severe enforcement actions using instrumental variable regressions. The control variables discussed in the notes to Table 3 are included. We only show second-stage results. First-stage results are available upon request. 
The standard errors are clustered on the county and bank level respectively, and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Financial crisis years (2000-2002 and 2007-2009) excluded. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
